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NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL EDUCATIONt
1EVIEWED BY A. KENNETH PYE*
This Report, prepared for the Carnegie Commission on Higher
Education by the late Herbert L. Packer, sometime Provost of Stanford
University and, at the time of his death, Jackson Eli Reynolds Pro-
fessor of Law at the Stanford Law School, and Dean Thomas Ehrlich
of the Stanford Law School, more closely resembles a well-written
introduction to an anthology than a book. Appended are the 1971
Report to the Association of American Law Schools, entitled Training
for the Public Professions of the Law: 19711 (Carrington Report),
and a 1968 article by Professor Calvin Woodard of the University of
Virginia.2 Appended to the Carrington Report are the 1921 Report,
also entitled Training for the Public Profession of the Law, by Alfred
Z. Reed; a review of contemporary reaction to the Reed Report by
Professor Preble Stolz of the University of California; and articles by
the late Professor Brainerd Currie3 and Professor Lester J. Mazor of
Hampshire College.
The book relies heavily on these materials, particularly the Car-
rington Report.4 It summarizes much of contemporary thought about
legal education in a cogent fashion and discusses proposals for, and
obstacles to, changes. Few of the ideas are new and most have been
t By Herbert L. Packer and Thomas Ehrlich with the assistance of Stephen
Pepper. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1972. 91 pp.; Appendices,
289 pp.
* B.A. 1951, University of Buffalo; I.D. 1953, LL.M. 1955, Georgetown
University. Acting Dean and Professor of Law, Duke University.
1. This Report first appeared as "Training for the Public Professions of
the Law: 1971," Part One, Section II, Proceedings, Association of American
Law Schools, 1971 Annual Meeting.
2. C. Woodard, The Limits of Legal Realism: An Historical Perspective,
54 VA. L. REV. 689 (1968).
3. B. Currie, The Materials of Law Study, 3 J. LEGAL ED. 331 (1951)
(Parts I & II), 8 J. LEGAL ED. 1 (1955) (Part III); edited by A.D. Cullison.
4. Many of the ideas in the Carrington Report were suggested earlier in
the structure and curriculum studies conducted at Stanford Law School during
1968-69.
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discussed widely among legal educators during recent years.5 They
are presented in a short, highly readable piece that provides both an
excellent summary of some of the matters now being debated in the
law schools and an excellent introduction for a broader lay audience
which may be unaware of either the ferment or apathy which alter-
nately seem to characterize legal education.
The book is narrow in scope, dealing primarily with the structure
and financing of legal education. Occasionally the discussion of
structure requires reference to curriculum and teaching methodology,
but the authors have chosen not to discuss such issues as the selection,
promotion and tenure of faculty, the governance of law schools and
student participation therein, and admissions policy (except for a
statement in the preface that women and racial minorities are in-
adequately represented in law schools and that much remains to be
done about the problem).
The principal thesis is that all law schools are more alike than
they are different. All do not provide legal education of the same
quality but "all share the same structural features and are bound by
that structure."6 Specifically, the authors note:
1. [The law schools'] primary mission is the education of students
for entry into the legal profession.
2. The faculties of none are primarily engaged in research.
3. None engages in undergraduate education.
4. None offers a professional degree (LL.B. or J.D.) in less than
three academic years.7
The principal cause of this "sameness" was the rejection by the
Bar in 1921 of Alfred Z. Reed's recommendation for a differentiated
bar with some members trained to do some things and some trained
to do others, with competency enforced by examinations. Instead, the
American Bar Association accepted the proposals of a Committee
headed by Elihu Root:
1. Before admission to the bar of any state a candidate should be
required to have (a) graduated from a law school complying with
certain standards, and (b) passed an examination by public au-
thority determining his fitness.
5. A draft of the Carrington Report was discussed at a special conference
in Washington in the spring of 1971, and at the annual meeting of the Associa-
tion of American Law Schools in December of that year. It has been. dis-
tributed to every full-time law teacher.
6. H.L. PACKER & T. EHRLIcH, NEw DmEcTioNs IN LEOAL EDUcATION 24




2. A certified law school should require three years of full-time legal
education or the same number of hours in part-time study over a
longer period.
3. The Council of Legal Education and Admission to the Bar should
certify which law schools have complied with the applicable stand-
ards, and should publish from time to time the names of those that
do and do not comply with the standards.8
The result has been the imposition of what the authors call the
"Harvard Model" upon all legal education. The characteristic of
"sameness" also inheres in teaching methodology with its primary
reliance on the case-method and Socratic dialog, supplemented by
seminar work and independent research. Even the unique feature of
legal education, the student-edited law review, is deemed an essential
for respectability by most law schools without regard to whether the
quality of their student body or the resources at their disposal will
produce a creditable product. Legal scholarship also reflects a nar-
row frame of reference, usually either involving analysis, synthesis
and critique of "legal materials" which are available in the law school
library, or the evaluation of empirical data about how the law oper-
ates in action.
The authors argue that legal education should and will replace
sameness with diversity. Law schools should escape the grip of a
single model which has stifled flexibility in the past. The authors
predict that there will be more diversity in the future:
We expect that some schools with limited financial resources will
concentrate the expenditure of those resources in a few areas in order
to maintain the highest standards of educational excellence in those
areas. Other more well-endowed schools may continue their past
practices of broad curricular coverage. But even these schools, we
suspect, will try different approaches and different techniques in legal
education.9
Such diversity is necessary, in the view of the authors, to meet the
changing demands of the legal profession-the expanding need for
legal services, the movement towards specialization, and the expansion
of the use of paraprofessionals. Diversity should come about by
modifying the structures, goals, and methodology of legal education.
The authors urge more law schools to require less than four
years of college as a prerequisite for entrance for more students, and
urge that two years of law school is adequate for many students.
8. Id. at 27.
9. Id. at 84.
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During the immediate future, most law schools should begin to offer
both a two-year and three-year degree program. The first year of
law school would continue to be designed to educate "generalists,"
but with much greater emphasis on "macroissues, 10 as opposed to
microissues, of doctrine."" The authors are not certain whether this
change of focus can be managed without sacrificing training in legal
analysis,' 2 but hope that some schools will experiment. It is unclear
what changes should occur in the remaining year (or years). They
discuss, without critical comment, the Carrington Report's recommen-
dations which divide upper class offerings into two groups-"inten-
sive instruction," that is, detailed exploration of narrow topics in small
classes, and "extensive instruction," or broader areas taught by lecture
or audiovisual methods to large groups.
Special attention is devoted to the claims of clinical education,
defined as "teaching a law student by having him actually perform the
tasks of a lawyer.' 3 They question the classic claims propounded by
advocates of the clinical approach that (1) the use of law students
will help substantially in providing legal services to those unable to
afford them, and that clinical programs (2) teach skills which cannot
be taught more effectively in other ways, (3) impart a special "under-
standing of society," and (4) teach professional responsibility ef-
fectively. That clinical programs provide an educational input into
the remainder of the law school curriculum is recognized, but viewed
only as an incidental benefit. The authors doubt that the increased
costs, which they assume will be associated with clinical education,
10. The phrase is that of Professor Alfred Conard. A. Conard, Macrojustice:
A Systematic Approach to Conflict Resolution, 5 GA. L. REv. 415 (1971). The
concept of "macrojustice" entails broadening the scope of legal scholarship by,
among other things, borrowing viable methods and systems from allied dis-
ciplines. See PACKER & EHRLICH 58.
11. PACKER & EHRLICH 51.
12. It may not be inappropriate to recall Lord Justice Diplock's comments
in another context:
I am not a customer particularly interested in those who study law as
a liberal education. I must confess, in provoking parenthesis, that I
do not regard law as a fit medium of liberal education for those who
are destined to practise it. I do not doubt that it can be taught con-
ceptually, philosophically or sociologically so as to give it a liberal
flavour but I challenge the claim that to do so results in teaching a stu-
dent to "think as a lawyer." To think as a philosopher, to think as
a sociologist perhaps, but those who practice the law-Judges, Bar-
risters and Solicitors-are concerned with cases rather than with con-
cepts. . . Of course a practising lawyer needs a liberal education
but in my view, which I think is shared by a large proportion of prac-
titioners, the liberal education should come first and the study of law
thereafter. Diplock, Introduction to a Discussion of the Wilson Report,
J. Soc'Y PuB. TEACi-ERs OF L. 193-194 (1966).
13. PACKER & EHRLICH 38.
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will produce a commensurate benefit, and conclude that clinical ed-
ucation is only one of many ideas that deserve experimentation.
Agreement is also expressed with the Carrington Report's con-
clusions that (a) law schools should not hesitate to provide bar re-
view courses, (b) law schools should provide education to part-time
students, (c) some should devote resources to developing training
programs for paraprofessionals (although the authors assert that the
principal burden of educating paraprofessionals should be on com-
munity colleges), and (d) broader programs should be initiated for
the study of law by undergraduates.
Of particular significance is their concept of the new directions
which scholarship should pursue:
Legal scholarship in this country has passed through two phases.
The first was a Langdellian search for scientific principles that could
be gathered by an inductive process through analysis of appellate
court decisions. In the second phase, legal scholarship concentrated
on getting the answers to questions about means of achieving objec-
tives through methodological broadening of the scope of inquiry to
center on the facts of the real world. This phase, which we may call
the Legal Realist phase, ran into the dead end of being concerned
only with means to the exclusion of ends. It made lawyers into mere
technicians. The challenge now is to bring the study of law into a
position in which it focuses on the goals for which its techniques are
used. Adding the broadening of the second phase to the search for
principles of the first phase can result in the study of means/ends
relationships. This is where allied disciplines can contribute to making
law a discipline more receptive to ideas from other fields. Thereby,
we hope that law will be enabled to take its rightful place not as a
science but as an art that is supported by a distinctive craft. Another
way of stating this direction is to say that legal scholarship can be-
come what some law professors are in the university today-capable
of addressing themselves to any problem that has a social context.14
There is obviously much merit in many of these observations.
One key recommendation, the two-year law program, seems unlikely
to eventuate in the foreseeable future;15 but other suggestions in the
14. Id. at 58.
15. The death of the two-year degree program at the February 4, 1972
meeting of the American Bar Association Council on Legal Education and Ad-
mission to the Bar with the deans of the nation's law schools is described in
P. Stolz, The Two-Year Law School: The Day the Music Dies, 25 J. LEG. ED.
37 (1973). Professor Stolz singles out Dean Sacks of Harvard, Dean Wolfman
of Pennsylvania, Dean Sovern of Columbia and Dean Goldstein of Yale for
special comment. The blame (or praise) should be more widely distributed. In
Vol. 1973:8991
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book, such as the introduction of the "macrojustice" approach, may
pose viable alternatives. There is little doubt that, as the authors
indicate, legal education now succeeds in "turning off" a large num-
ber of students after the first year (or first semester), but we have
known that for a long time.16 What is not clear is what will "turn
them on" and at the same time provide them with the intellectual
qualities, attitudes, and knowledge they need to have before they
enter the profession.
Some thoughtful observers believe that law schools err in placing
their primary emphasis upon the appellate decision rather than upon a
factual approach to legal controversies. Such critics do not, however,
advocate a return to the generalized empirical approach of the Legal
Realist phase, but endorse instead a more particularized dissection of
the factual settings which generate litigation. They are not concerned
only with the emotional trauma of the student who cannot win at
intellectual ping pong with his professor, or with the destructive syn-
drome which results from a process of constantly tearing apart cases
within a rigid frame of reference, without ever "brain-storming" or
constructing solutions to the problems which produced the contro-
versies under study. The heart of their criticism is that the Socratic
method applied to appellate cases develops only a few of the intellect-
ual traits which a lawyer should possess. Therefore, it should be only
an important part of the school educational process-not, as it is now,
the cornerstone. Law schools should begin to define what they want
to accomplish and what techniques are best adapted to these accomp-
lishments. The answers to these questions will determine the appro-
priateness of alternative structures.
An adequate reappraisal of the role of the law school requires
that a number of issues be confronted directly. Should not an ability
to assimilate and evaluate facts be a part of first-year instruction as
much as doctrinal analysis? Can doctrine be taught as effectively
from simulation models constructed from case files or audiovisual
materials as from case books? Should we not teach more of process
and less of analysis and synthesis?17  Why do we not try to provide
an equivalent of law journal experience to our weakest students in-
any case the proposal of a two-year law school contained in a revision of the
ABA Standards for Accreditation was dropped by the Council following the
meeting.
16. See W. Gellhorn, The Second and Third Years of Law Study, 17 J. LEO.
ED. 1 (1964).
17. This may be embraced in the proposed study of "macrojustice," which
the authors discuss. PACKER & EHRLIcH 58, 61.
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stead of reserving it for those who need the training the least? How
can a small school rationally design a curriculum, when some students
after graduation will benefit from individualized tutorial programs
which characterize the routine in large law firms, while other students
will never receive an equivalent experience? How can large schools
be expected to provide small group learning experiences, clinical or
otherwise, to more than a small percentage of their students?
What will be the impact of the thousands of additional law students
upon schools whose libraries, faculties and financial aid resources
have not increased proportionately? What reasons suggest that ten-
ured faculty who have been teaching the same courses by the case
method for twenty to forty years will now be prepared to transform
the structure, curriculum, and methodology of a school in order to
determine if the new ideas now being advanced are better than the
old way of doing things? Are there ideas being considered in legal
education abroad or in medical education from which law schools
might profit? 8
This reviewer hoped to see a provocative discussion of some of
these issues, but was disappointed. The reasons for the omissions
probably are found in the chapter on Financing Legal Education.
The authors observe that most law schools are self-supporting and
that in many private universities the law school subsidizes other more
costly divisions. They do not add that, in some state universities, the
law school enrollment and teaching loads are used to generate funds
from state legislatures, considerable portions of which are then di-
verted into other graduate disciplines.
Historically, universities have operated on the premise that legal
education is cheap--and it is inexpensive as compared with medical
education or with any graduate program. It is inexpensive because
in no other graduate or professional educational endeavor do profes-
sors teach classes of over 100 students who are expected to pay their
own way. Even the physical facilities cost less than many disciplines'.
Supported research is the exception rather than the rule. Traditional-
ly, law schools have been a good bargain from the viewpoint of the
university. But law schools that offer alternative professional tracks,
small-group learning experiences, and clinical programs, and that have
18. There is no reference, for instance, to the 1971 Omrod Report in the
United Kingdom. REPORT OF THE COMMTEE ON LEGAL EDUCATION, CMND.
No. 4595 (1971). The Report preceded the publication in this country of an




a commitment to university-supported research, will be much less
inexpensive.
The real issues facing legal education are not whether law schools
are going to adopt a clinical model or the Carrington Report, but
whether the present level of excellence can be maintained in the face
of the financial plight of higher education, particularly in the private
sector. The authors make passing reference to the general problem,
but its special significance for law schools receives much less attention
than it deserves. 19
During the last two decades, graduate schools have expanded in
large part at public expense. Buildings have been erected without an
increase in endowment sufficient to cover maintenance and operation
costs. Efforts have been made to broaden opportunities for the dis-
advantaged, producing an obvious impact on financial aid resources.
A galaxy of federal regulatory statutes applied to universities during
the last decade has added substantially to administrative costs.
The federal government is now reducing its level of support for
graduate education. Wages, utility, and book costs are increasing at
an even more rapid rate than is the general cost of living. The cut-
back in government contracts and grants is reducing university re-
covery of overhead expenses. Alumi giving has not recovered fully
from the disenchantment brought about by the student disruptions of
the sixties. Endowment income is rising, but not at a rate sufficient
to offset the higher costs. Already undergraduate education is facing
the reality that annual tuition increases cannot continue indefinitely
without limiting the number of students who can afford to attend.
University administrators are not oblivious to the thousands of first-
rate students who want and are willing to pay for a legal education,
nor are they unaware that few among the best students are prepared
to pay for the kind of education provided by most graduate schools.
In this setting, new proposals which will substantially increase
the costs of law schools are visionary at best. Unless private universi-
ties make hard decisions to limit the number and size of their costly
graduate programs and eliminate some marginal professional schools,
many law schools will find that their percentage of available university
resources will actually decrease. The weaker law schools, which must
depend almost exclusively upon tuition revenues to meet their opera-
tional expenses, will pay more of the deficit created by the more ex-
19. Principal reliance is placed upon E. CHErT, THE NEW DE-PRSSION IN
HIGHER EDUCATION (1971). See also E. CHErT, THE NEw DEPRESSION IN
HIGHER EDUCATION Two YEARs LA ER (1973).
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pensive divisions of the university, usually through the technique of
increased charges for indirect expenses (overhead). The stronger
schools (referred to as "elite" by the authors), which often operate at
a deficit assumed by a richly-endowed parent university, will experi-
ence a decrease in the subsidies which they receive from their universi-
ty endowments or state funds.
There is little hope for implementation of many of the proposals
discussed in the book unless the law schools can generate alternative
sources of institutional funding and persuade university administrators
not to use it for other purposes. The authors suggest several potential
sources for exploitation: law schools are admonished to develop vari-
ous supporting constituencies-the legal profession, employers of law
school graduates, nonlawyers, corporate benefactors, foundations and
the federal government. Most law schools have been trying with
limited success for some time to persuade lawyers to provide annual
support and capital gifts. The task of attracting long-term support of
substance from corporations and nonlawyers is even less likely to be
successful. Foundations rarely provide general support, as distin-
guished from special project aid, and are leery of support which deals
with "political" issues-and much of the kind of value-oriented schol-
arship recommended by the authors inevitably will do so. Support to
legal education from the federal government has been slight and large-
ly in the form of special project support, 20 construction funding, and
student loans. Special project support is both de minimis and highly
specialized; construction grants have ceased; and the Administration
has proposed to terminate National Defense Education Act loans and
to substitute government guaranteed programs which entail appreci-
ably higher interest rates. To my knowledge no one in government
has suggested federal scholarships to law students beyond the limited
funding made available to disadvantaged law students under the Coun-
cil on Legal Education Opportunity (CLEO) program.21
20. The authors refer to the National Science Foundation and the National
Endowment for the Humanities, but inexplicably ignore the Office of Economic
Opportunity and the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration which have
been the sources of substantial funds. There is no mention of the proposed
National Institute of Justice, or the failure of its proposed predecessor, the Na-
tional Foundation of Law.
21. CLEO is a joint enterprise of the American Bar Association, the Associ-
ation of American Law Schools and the Law School Admissions Council. Fund-
ing has been provided by the Office of Economic Opportunity. The Education
Amendments of 1972 amended Section 963(a) of the Higher Education Act of
1965 to provide for individual stipends of $2800 "for persons of ability from
disadvantaged backgrounds . . . undertaking . . . professional study." Section
963(b) provides for a payment of 150% of the stipend as a "cost of education"
Vol. 1973:899]
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A second proposal is to finance legal education through increased
borrowing. This is already being done. Several types of programs
are recommended: university loans, government-guaranteed loan
programs, and deferred tuition. Duke Law School, for example, has
all of these programs in operation, and alumni subsidization of com-
mercial loans in addition; but it is clear that there comes a point at
which many students cannot, will not, or should not borrow more
money, even in exchange for an excellent education.
The authors also suggest that law schools or universities should bor-
row, pay back the interest (presumably out of tuition) and continually
refinance the principal. One may wonder how long a bootstrap op-
eration of this kind can continue before much of current tuition in-
come is charged to servicing the debt of previous generations of
students. The authors' suggestion that lenders might forego part of
interest payments as charitable contributions suggests a higher level
of beneficence on the part of West Coast banks than seems to be
found among their Southeastern cousins.
In short, the financial dilemma is a major problem facing legal
education today, and little can be expected in the way of fundamental
change until it is alleviated. Greater diversity may occur, but it may
be diversity caused by cutbacks of programs due to financial exigency,
rather than as a consequence of academic decisions. Certainly any
movement toward cutting the number of years (and thereby the tuition
paid by students) will meet resistance from many law schools even if
the Bar could be persuaded to accelerate its assimilation of some
150,000 new lawyers during the next six years.
My principal criticism of the book is its failure to emphasize
these external restraints, or the internal reality that change must be
accomplished by agreement among faculty members-many of whom
think legal education now is vastly better than any other kind of ed-
ucation offered in the university, and are reluctant to tinker with a
proven product. Nevertheless, the book performs the valuable func-
tion of informing higher education of law school problems, and pro-
viding the periodic stimulation which law professors need to remind
them, not too gently, that criticism of legal education cannot always be
answered by the response, "We have always done it this way."
allowance to the institution attended by the fellowship recipient. Only $1,000,000
was authorized to cover the costs of stipends and "cost of education" allowances.
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